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LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE OPTIONS TO SUPPORT  






The purpose of this research is to identify the maintenance and logistics support structure 
needed to support the P-8A’s Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-surface Warfare 
(ASUW), and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, while 
operating away from Permanent Deployment Sites (PDS) in austere operating areas, and 
to provide a set of possible support recommendations for these missions.  This study will 
focus on the existing maintenance and logistics support structures currently being utilized 
for missions being performed by the P-3 Orion, and to propose organizational and 
operational recommendations to better support the agile, flexible, and responsive 
missions requirement of the P-8A.  The result will provide feasible alternatives for 
decision-makers regarding organizational design as well as logistics and maintenance 
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Expeditionary Warfare requires its practitioner to devote as much time 
towards preparation for supporting forces logistically as it does to getting 
them to the theater of operations and using them once they get there. 
(Bradford, 2006, p. 5) 
The Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRF) is the United States’ 
premier Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-surface Warfare (ASUW), and maritime 
and littoral armed Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset utilized in 
providing responsive and worldwide forward presence, deterrence, maritime security, sea 
control, power projection, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (WBB Consulting 
2007, p. i).  Its mission is to provide “first on-scene” mission coverage against ever-
changing, worldwide maritime and littoral threats (WBB Consulting, 2007, p. i).  
The current platform of the MPRF (and the longest sustained naval aviation 
program currently in the fleet) is the land-based maritime patrol aircraft, the P-3C Orion.  
The Orion has been the Navy’s primary maritime patrol aircraft since the early 1960s and 
was built on a “fixed” force structure and positioning that was primarily designed to 
guard against threats of the Soviet Union during the “Cold War” (WBB Consulting, 
2007).  In 2008, the MPRF community recognized the need to transition away from fixed 
basing and a rigid logistics and support system and toward a force capable of meeting the 
ever-evolving threats and the challenges of the 21st century.  In order to make these 
changes, it requires having immediate and sustained access to any region of the world 
(Naval Air Systems Command, 2009).  This meant having the ability to operate away 
from fixed basing structure, and operate at forward operating locations (FOL) without 
significant external support, creating a flexible, scalable, responsive, and expeditionary 
force capable of reacting to threats worldwide (WBB Consulting, 2007).  
This new concept of deployment would require a robust, sustainable platform 
other than the aging P-3C, which had already gone through several service-life extensions 
from its initial 7,500 to 20,000 flight hours.  The weapon system chosen to meet the 
Navy’s needs in ASW, ASUW and ISR missions is the Boeing P-8A Poseidon Multi-
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mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), a design utilizing a 737-800 fuselage with 737-900 
wings (Naval Air Systems Command, 2009).  
Given the introduction of an aircraft that fundamentally differs in design from its 
predecessor (switching from turboprop to turbofan), and the new concept of operations 
that depends upon an entirely different sustainment concept, the MPRF faces new 
challenges that can potentially affect the sustainability of its missions.  This new 
expeditionary deployment concept presents a logistics challenge because the concept of 
operations and deployment for the new P-8A relies very little upon historical fixed 
deployment sites with an already established support infrastructure (former P-3C fixed 
FOLs), but instead on strategic international airfields closest to the maritime and littoral 
threat, and in possibly austere environments.  The current maintenance concept for the P-
3C is based upon a hub-and-spoke model with X-level maintenance at the hub and Y-
level maintenance at the spoke; this model has been both effective and efficient with 
respect to generating fully mission capable operational sorties (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.   Hub-Spoke Operational Concept 
The P-8A will instead require the movement of maintenance and operations 
support assets—to include equipment and personnel—to the Forward Operating Location 
(FOL) to sustain the aircraft and crew for an extended period.  This new requirement to 
transport personnel, ground support equipment, maintenance tools, spare parts, 
habitability, weapons, and fuel presents a significant challenge to the P-8A community as 
MPRF does not have dedicated airlift assets and must rely on the shared transportation 
resources and established regulations of both Commanders of the U.S. Joint Forces 
Command (USJFC) and the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY OF OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONARY SUPPORT 
In May of 1898, the United States sent troops across the Pacific Ocean for the first 
time to fight against Spain in the Philippines in what was to become the Spanish-
American War.  The 1898 deployment of troops to Manila Bay marked the inauguration 
of a new type of warfare in the U.S. military: expeditionary warfare (Bradford, 2006).  
The acquisition of the Philippines brought the United States its first commitment to 
defend a territory outside the western hemisphere, requiring changes in the roles of the 
Army and Navy to meet the requirements of maintaining territories that spread across the 
Pacific Ocean.  The difficulty of sustaining transoceanic military operations outside 
North America became a military concern for both services.    
Expeditionary warfare involves overseas operations and must include a naval 
segment in any operation; however, throughout its history, the Navy has been slow to 
embrace any change that shifts focus away from a Mahanian fleet-on-fleet engagement.  
Navy strategic planning in the early 20th century focused on winning surface battles and, 
to a lesser degree, conducting amphibious warfare.  Not until the 1920s did the Navy and 
Marine Corps work together to establish expeditionary forces specifically for future 
amphibious operations.  The Marine Corps focused on amphibious warfare and 
developed doctrine that separated Landing Operations from long-term expeditionary 
warfare and did not address any long-term logistical support for Marines once ashore 
(Bradford, 2006). These early experiences in expeditionary warfare would be the 
foundation upon which the Navy would rely when developing aircraft and their 
accompanying concepts of operation to project power, surveil the battlespace, and attack 
both surface and undersea vessels. 
B. MARITIME PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE FORCE (MPRF) 
The mission of Maritime Reconnaissance and Patrol Force (MPRF) originated 
with coastal reconnaissance patrols during World War II, developing into open-ocean 
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missions to seek out German and Japanese submarines.  Following World War II, the 
MPRF’s mission evolved to adapt to the new challenges of the “Cold War” era, and the 
threats of the Soviet Union’s submarines and surface ships (Osborne & Prindle, 2003, p. 
276).  Since then, the mission for MPRF has expanded beyond ASW and ASUW.   
MPRF has become one of the United States’ most valuable national assets in 
countering maritime threats.  However, as MPRF leaders transition MPRF from its 
existing “Cold War” structure to one that can better respond to 21st century maritime 
threats anywhere around the world, they have developed five key characteristics to 
transform the organization:  (1) Agile—eliminate the dependence on fixed deployment 
locations and rigid logistics and support systems; (2) Flexible—create an Expeditionary 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) with global Command and Control (C2) allowing 
operational effectiveness anywhere in the world; (3) Scalable—create deployment 
packages, outfitted and sized for each specific mission; (4) Responsive—capability to 
deploy forces on short notice; and (5) Supported—expeditionary capability through 
expeditionary maintenance (WBB Consulting, 2007, pp. 1–2). 
Currently, MPRF leaders conduct operations using the P-3 and the EP-3.  MPRF’s 
transition to its expeditionary force concept will require the transition to three different 
platforms: the P-8A Poseidon, the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), and the Mobile Tactical Operations Centers (MTOC) 
acting as the centerpiece of the MPRF mission in providing continuous C2 and 
Command, Control, Computing, Communication, and Intelligence (C4I) (WBB 
Consulting, 2007, pp. 3–4).  
The MPRF will assume the following as primary missions: 
 ASW, 
 ASUW, 
 Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR), 
 C3, 
 Command and Control Warfare (C2W), 
 Mobility, 
 and Mine Warfare (MIW). 
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Secondary mission areas are elements of: 
 Strike Warfare (STW), 
 Missions of State (MOS), 
 Non-Combatant Operations (NCO), 
 Fleet Support Operations (FSO), 
 Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), 
 Amphibious Warfare (AMW), 
 and Homeland Defense (HLD). 
In addition to those missions identified above, the MPRF has adopted other missions to 
include maritime interdictions, counterdrug activities, maritime shipping protection, and 
overland strike mission support (WBB Consulting, 2007).   
C. NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established the NAMP to set standards and 
guidelines for the three levels of maintenance in naval aviation. As time progressed and 
systems became more complex, the NAMP changed to capture concepts utilized in the 
civilian industry. This established metrics in cost savings. The latest version of the 
NAMP incorporates new policies for FRCs. The objective of the NAMP is to improve 
aviation material readiness and safety standards within the Navy and the Marine Corps 
(Naval Air Systems Command, 2009). 
1. Levels of Maintenance 
The NAMP is based on three levels of maintenance: Organizational, Intermediate 
and Depot. The Navy established these levels to facilitate better management of 
personnel, material and funds. The result was maximum availability of aircraft to the 
fleet. The NAMP provides standard operating procedures for establishing and 
maintaining each level of the organization. 
a. Organizational-Level Maintenance 
Organizational-level maintenance activity is the lowest level of 
maintenance in which mechanics perform the day-to-day scheduled and unscheduled 
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maintenance on the aircraft. Scheduled maintenance is performed on two schedules: 
calendar and hourly. Hourly inspections are based on how many hours the aircraft has 
flown or the total amount of engine hours operated. They are conducted within a time 
interval of ± 10% of the scheduled inspection (e.g., a 100-hour inspection can be 
completed at between 90 and 110 hours). Calendar inspections are based on days and 
weeks. They are performed within ± 3 days from the scheduled date. For example, an 84-
day inspection can be performed on any day between day 81 and day 87 (Naval Air 
Systems Command, 2009). 
b. Intermediate-Level Maintenance 
Intermediate-level Maintenance activity is the second level of maintenance 
defined within the NAMP. It is performed at IMAs or AIMDs and is supported by the 
FRCs. The Navy recently established a structure in which IMAs and AIMDs, which used 
to be stand-alone activities, now fall under the control of the FRCs.  The FRC brings a 
concept of combining highly skilled and knowledgeable depot artisans with Navy Sailors, 
enabling minimal depot-level repairs to be performed at the local IMAs and AIMDs. The 
Navy implemented this measure in an effort to reduce costs and increase availability of 
Ready-for-Issue (RFI) components. 
c. Depot-Level Maintenance 
Depot-level Maintenance activity is the Navy’s most in-depth maintenance 
facility and falls under the FRCs. Within the depot facilities lie the Navy’s artisans. They 
bring years of aviation maintenance experience that ensures operational efficiency and 
integrity of systems. Their abilities include manufacturing parts, modifying, testing, 
inspecting, sampling and reclamation. The FRC sites also provide engineering assistance 
to the Organizational and Intermediate maintenance levels to determine disposition of 
discrepancies beyond their maintenance capabilities. 
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D. AVIATION LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE AT FORWARD 
OPERATING BASES 
The P-8A deployment model differs significantly from that used by the P-3, as is 
its maintenance and logistics support while operating from forward locations.  The level 
of maintenance approved for the P-8A aircraft is primarily a two-level concept (2LM), 
from organizational to the depot level (O-D); O-level being remove and replace (with 
limited troubleshooting), and D-level referring to complete depot-level repair/overhaul 
(DON, 2008).  This concept limits the amount of maintenance to be performed when 
forward deployed to remote and possibly austere locations (WBB Consulting, 2007,  
p. 18).  Although mostly O-D, the P-8A still has some systems on the aircraft that remain 
as intermediate (I-level) functions, specifically Aviation Life Support Systems (ALSS), 
Ordnance, and Battery Maintenance.  With the P-3 infrastructure currently in place, I-
level organizations such as Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMD) or 
Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC) already exist in CONUS, Hawaii, and in the 5th, 6th, and 
7th Fleet areas of operations (AOR).  The Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) for the P-3 is 
located at NAS Jacksonville, FL.  With the P-8A, additional parts support may come 
from commercial means as the Navy negotiates the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) Dual Use Parts Management Program (DUPMP) in which the Navy shares 
common parts with the commercial fleet of Boeing 737s worldwide (Willett, 2009, p. 8).  
Maintenance and logistics support at FOLs will vary depending on the length of 
the contingency operation at that location, with Logistics support to the forward bases 
accomplished by means of airlift or sealift (WBB Consulting, 2007).  
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Resupply points of origin will be from DoD/DLA storage facilities located in 
Guam, Bahrain, or Spain (WBB Consulting, 2007).  All inter-theater airlifts will be 
provided by U.S. Air Force C-5 or C-17, and all intra-theater airlifts will be transported 
by means of C-17, C-40, or C-130.  
Required aviation ground support equipment (GSE) will be airlifted to Cat-0 
through Cat-2 FOL airfields, and categorized in three types of kits:  (1) Fly-away Kit—
equipment that travels with the aircraft; (2) Pack-up Kit—equipment that travels with the 
maintenance support team; and (3) Follow-on Support Kit—additional equipment needed 
to support extended operations (WBB Consulting, 2007). The airlift of spares and general 
supplies to support the forward-deployed detachments depends on a number of factors, 
specifically the size and duration of the detachment, and the operating environment, 
system usage, and availability in the open market.  Fuel for both aircraft and GSE will be 
transported to the FOL either by airlift or sealift, depending on the fuel type (see Table 
1).  Mission and Life Support Equipment will be required at all FOLs, and will be 
transported to site by means of airlift.  




III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERSEAS COMBAT SUPPORT BASING  
Based on recent denial of U.S. military access by several countries, the Air Force 
took an in-depth look at Air Force forward-positioned bases to determine where combat 
support assets should be forward positioned (Lang, 2009).  The study also identified 
locations for the Air Force to place combat support basing material that will cover a 
broad range of potential missions and maintaining the flexibility to shift assets to other 
locations while supporting the mission.  The Air Force took an approach of looking at the 
problem from a global combat support network that is reliable against node disruptions 
and robust against problems or uncertainties.  There are two questions asked regarding 
overseas basing: “How capable are the Air Force’s current overseas combat support bases 
of managing the future environment?” and “What are the costs and benefits of using 
additional or alternative overseas combat support bases for storing combat support 
materiel?” 
When planning for the likely location for future deployments, decision-makers 
may know the exact location, or they may make changes to the site prior to deployment 
as political situation dictates (Lang, 2009, p. 14).  Locations where items are ultimately 
needed are called demand nodes.  A different type of node in the logistics network is a 
supply node, where items demanded are stored until they are requisitioned and then 
transported to the end-user.  Decision-makers determine node location based on several 
factors, including how close the node should be located to possible points of demand.  If 
demand is not equally dispersed across points, then the nodes should be placed closer to 
points with higher demand (Lang, 2009).  Decision-makers must also identify risks as 
they determine the location of supply nodes; risks associated with node location could 
include such things as force protection, severe weather, and availability of local resources 
(labor, fuel, utilities).   
Transportation between supply nodes and demand nodes is a basic requirement 
unless they are collocated and the transfer of items does not require additional resources.  
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Leaders determine which transportation type will be used for shipment depending on 
special shipping requirements, and what local transportation infrastructure is available.  
Typical transportation networks will require vehicles to transport between supply nodes 
and demand nodes; however, aircraft and helicopters are widely used to transport items 
from supply nodes.  Time is often a factor for nodes when transportation is required; time 
becomes the critical factor for supporting a demand node’s high-priority requisition.  
Transportation specialists, item managers, and suppliers all consider tracking time to be a 
critical measurement as an item makes its way through the warehouse and transportation 
network and finally between nodes.  Time is tracked by many stakeholders as a crucial 
metric that measures effectiveness or responsiveness of the entire supply chain.  Supply 
chains that include an international segment must transverse multiple modes of 
transportation through several military tollgates as well as customs.  International nodes 
have many more obstacles to overcome compared to the vanilla hub-and-node system in 
CONUS. 
The researchers sought to develop an analytic tool to assist policy-makers to 
identify and locate a reliable set of facility locations for the Air Force to position combat 
support basing and the materiel that allows for potential disruptions in the nodes and 
support network.  Researchers offer recommendations, including preparing for multiple 
nodes failures simultaneously, expanding potential nodes and networks in South 
American locations, and cautioning against multiple facilities loss along with 
transportation failure.  Based on our analysis, we recommend that: 
 Using global approach to select combat support basing locations is more 
effective and efficient than allocating resources on a regional basis. 
 Political and other concerns need to be addressed in any decision about 
potential overseas basing locations. 
 Closer attention should be paid to Africa and South America both as a 




B. CHINESE ANTI-ACCESS STRATEGY AND EXPEDITIONARY BASING  
China’s overall anti-access strategy for dealing with the U.S. military includes 
attacks against its logistics system.  By attacking United States forces in this manner, 
China would render existing forces in the region less effective or more vulnerable 
because of a lack of timely supplies of material needed for warfighting.  Chinese military 
planners note that the high technology requires more support than less-advanced or 
analog systems, which are not as resource dependent.  United States forces are heavily 
dependent and are supported by complex logistics systems; they require large “iron 
mountain” or support equipment to sustain operations.  The U.S. military has a critical 
vulnerability if an enemy strikes at the logistics system and can disrupt the logistical and 
transportation networks.  Military forces rely on oil, supplies, ammunition and other 
items, along with installations and bases, that are included in the United States’ “long 
supply lines and large [support] structure” (Cliff, 2007).  These are all soft targets, the 
destruction of which would be crippling (Cliff, Burles, Chase, Eaton & Pollpeter, 2007, 
p. 61).  Critical to the Chinese anti-access strategy is disruption of the enemy’s campaign 
depth or rear area railway and highway hubs, ports, bridges, and other transport systems 
and logistic supply networks (Cliff et al., 2007, p. 61).  According to PLA authors, the 
logistics infrastructure is especially vulnerable to missile strikes, air attack, and sabotage; 
this includes fuel storage bases, supply depots, and warehouse facilities (Cliff et al., 
2007). 
C. SELECTION OF STRATEGIC AIR BASES 
Wohlstetter, Hoffman, Lutz, and Rowen conducted a study in 1954 analyzing the 
critical factors in strategic base selection for the Air Force’s strategic bombing force.  
They discovered some interesting finds, based on Soviets threats to U.S. bases forward-
deployed overseas, that current decision-makers could reassess in light of existing threats 
from Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM).  Wohlstetter et al. found that overseas operating 
base systems are too vulnerable, and that air refueling and ground refueling are much less 
vulnerable to enemy attack than systems that rely on overseas operating bases.  Although 
they based their study on supporting B-47 aircraft, their findings will translate well into 
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21st century warfare because the concepts focus on basic aircraft support at overseas 
bases.  The advantages and disadvantages of locations will drive base selection by 
focusing on items such as proximity to targets, vulnerability to enemy attacks, logistics 
and the local economy all have great effects on the overall system cost and effectiveness 
of each of these locations.   
Wohlstetter et al. also identified that the supply distance on maintaining a wing of 
bombers in the United States must be increased by over 50 percent to cover the additional 
cost of operation from primary bases overseas (Wohlstetter, Hoffman, Lutz & Rowen, 
1954).  They also found that costs do not increase substantially with supply distances in 
peacetime.  Costs that are already high for overseas support are only moderately affected 
by increasing distance—even when the distances increase by up to 10,000 surface miles.  
There are extra costs involved in additional capability in an overseas base to meet bomber 
requirements (such as additional operating facilities, airlift, stocks, etc.).  Wohlstetter et 
al found that adding an additional refueling facility is much more cost-effective than 
adding complete operating facilities, even with vulnerability considerations.   
D. USMC AVIATION LOGISTICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FLY-AWAY 
KITS 
In April 1999, OPERATION NOBLE ANVIL presented Marine Corps aviation 
logistics planners with challenges that they had not encountered in the past.  Although 
they are accustomed to worldwide deployments in support of various operations and 
contingencies, Marine Air Group Thirty-One (MAG 31) and its Marine Aviation 
Logistics Squadron (MALS 31) received short notice orders to deploy in an “as is” state, 
with 24 of its 36 assigned F/A-18D aircraft. They were asked to deploy with the smallest 
possible footprint and to be self-sustained in support of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
against the former Republic of Yugoslavia, a location in which a deployment site from 
which to operate was not yet determined (Wade, 2002, p. 43).  MALS (an entity of the 
MAG that provides aviation intermediate “I-level” maintenance and logistics support to 
its assigned air wing or MAG) is structured to be mobile under the Marine Aviation 
Logistics Support Program (MALSP) (pp. 9–10).  A MALS consists of a variety of 
support packages, broken down like building blocks, which can be mobilized in different 
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configurations depending on mission requirements to support an air wing deployment.  
However, mobilizing all support packages requires large-scale transportation 
coordination and planning, as some items are flown in, and others prepositioned or 
sealifted via the Maritime Preposition Force (MPF) and Aviation Logistics Ships (T-
AVB).  The MAG required a small footprint, without the support of the MPF and T-
AVB.  MALS 31 aviation logistics planners faced two challenges:  (1) not all aircraft 
were deploying (so some support needed to be maintained at the MOB); and (2) the 
MALSP contingency package was too large of a footprint to transport all parts, mobile 
facilities, support equipment, and personnel in theater, in such a short period of time (pp. 
21–22). 
Planning for a short-notice deployment to an unknown location and having 
unknown resources and support channels can be difficult.  Therefore, MALS 31 
developed different levels of required support packages of maintenance and supply 
capabilities based on their criticality to the mission (based on historical data), and these 
support packages would then be tailored down as more information became available.  
Additionally, a Surveillance, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Part (SLRP) was sent out to 
provide area intelligence, and to perform a site survey of possible deployment sites, 
existing capabilities in the area, and potential issues the MALS and air wing may face.  
Once decision-makers choose a deployment site and determine requirements, the military 
must transport the identified support packages in stages so that they do not interrupt or 
hinder any maintenance support required to safely fly all 24 F/A-18D to their future base 
of operations (e.g., I-level support capabilities that were required to support the 
squadrons in transit and upon arrival accompanied the fly-in echelon (FIE) (Wade, 2002, 
pp. 30–31).  
Military leaders must organize the maintenance and logistics support packages by 
importance to the mission, and then tailor the packages down once requirements are 
known as a way to significantly reduce the footprint of the logistics support.  The Marine 
Corp continues to works with the MALSP model to determine support requirement for 
future deployments. 
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IV. TRANSITIONING FROM THE P-3C ORION TO P-8A 
POSEIDON 
A. P-3C ORION 
Since the Cold War, the MPRF has relied on the P-3 Orion to accomplish the 
ASW and ASUW missions, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and maritime and littoral 
armed Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), in addition to “first on-
scene” mission coverage around the world (WBB Consulting, 2007, p. i).  The Orion has 
been the Navy’s primary maritime patrol aircraft since the early 1960s, making it one of 
the longest sustained aviation programs in the Navy’s history. The Orion’s core mission 
is land-based long-range anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Over the years, it developed 
into an effective platform to execute other maritime missions such as anti-surface warfare 
(ASUW), command and control (C2), and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) (Tallant, Hedrick & Martin, 2008, p. 103).  The Orion has expanded over the years 
from a strictly maritime-focused platform to performing over-land missions in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq as part of naval aviation assets contributing to the joint air war.  
The P-3A took its first operational flight in August 1962.  After several updated 
versions, the current fleet of P-3Cs came to the Navy in August 1969.  During its 
production run, the P-3C Orion has seen several major improvements and upgrades 
including its current modernization programs.  All tactical systems (navigation, 
communications, and weapons systems) have been upgraded to satisfy Navy and joint 
requirements.  Beginning in 2004, decision-makers initiated Critical Obsolescence 
Program (COP) to improve availability among critical mission support systems.  The 
current ongoing sustainment program is extending the program to match its 
replacement’s roll-out schedule and reduce the fleet’s inventory to 130 aircraft by 2010.  
The Orion service-life ceiling was extended from 7,500 flight hours to 20,000 hours on 
all airframes with that limit being extended multiple times in certain airframes.  Leaders 
based the original limits on conservative assumptions about in-flight stresses such as 
maneuvers and payloads; new flight-hour limits reflect actual operating experience and a 
more modern analysis of the original fatigue test data (Tallant et al., 2008).  The elevated 
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flight-hours-per-airframe has rapidly degraded the P-3C mission availability and will 
push the Orion out of the operational fleet faster than the replacement can be fielded.   
In December 2008, a grounding of 39 P-3Cs for structural fatigue caused great 
concern about the aircraft’s reliability.  After ongoing analysis found stress cracks on the 
wings, decision-makers grounded one quarter of the fleet indefinitely until all the 
identified aircraft received an overhaul to reinforce the problem areas in the wings.  After 
the initial aircraft grounding, decision-makers determined that three of the affected 
aircraft should be retired from service.  An emergent program was established to 
refurbish aircraft structures to sustain all airframe lifespan. The Service Life Assessment 
Program (SLAP) has been funded through the supplemental budget in FY09 and will 
need to be funded in future-year operation and support costs if the program is to survive 
until the P-8A delivery. 
The current level of support required to sustain “peacetime deployment” 
operations can be substantial for an entire squadron of P-3C Orions at any of its three 
Primary Deployment Sites (PDS).  The reliance on large logistics and support 
infrastructure has made the patrol fleet rigid and inflexible, which has limited the reach of 
the P-3C and its ability to support operational commanders.  The P-3C is very limited in 
its ability to operate from austere airfields at remote locations without significant external 
support and lead-time.  The limited ability for the current patrol fleet to redeploy away 
from its PDS location and its incapacity to operate at forward operating locations have 
left the P-3C community on the outside looking in during contingency operations and 
rapid reaction missions.  During the current overseas contingency operations, the P-3C 
has operated from over 240 airfields worldwide in support of OIF, OEF, and other 
ongoing operations overseas. 
B. P-8A POSEIDON PROGRAM 
In 1998, the Navy completed a functional area needs analysis as part of its process 
to replace both the P-3C Maritime Patrol Fleet and the EP-3 Reconnaissance aircraft with 
a single replacement multi-mission aircraft (MMA).  As a result of the needs analysis, the 
Navy identified 19 tasks as suitable for the MMA platform that would meet a goal for 
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fleet rollout by the 2010–2015 timeframe.  The resulting mission needs statement (MNS) 
called for an aircraft required for Broad Area Maritime and Littoral Armed Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).  A Joint Undersea Surveillance Study that 
looked at eight critical capabilities required for undersea superiority. 
In 2002, the Navy conducted an Analysis of Alternatives that examined the 
requirement for both manned and unmanned options and joint programs already in the 
aviation arsenal that would fill the need identified by the National Military Strategy 
(NMS) and reinforced by the Undersea Superiority ICD.  The findings pointed to a 
medium sized commercial or military derivative manned aircraft for broad area ASW that 
could conduct the maritime ISR mission. As a result of its analyses, the Navy chose the 
P-8A Poseidon Maritime Multi-mission Aircraft (MMA) to counter the current and 
projected nuclear- and diesel-powered submarine threats (Tuemler, Cobough & Bacon, 
2009, Appendix-A-1).   The Poseidon will sustain Naval and Joint commanders in anti-
access areas during crisis, a cornerstone of Sea Power 21 capability areas of Sea Shield 
and Sea Basing (DON, 2008).  The P-8A will support elements of the Mine Warfare 
(MIW) capabilities alongside Command and Control missions (C2), as well as secondary 
mission areas will include elements of Strike warfare, military operations other than war 
(MOOTW), and supporting across the broad spectrum of range of military operations 
(ROMO). 
Designers based the P-8A airframe on a derivative of the Boeing 737 used 
commercially throughout the world (WBB Consulting, 2007, Appendix-A-1).  The P-8A 
will have a unique configuration for a 737 airframe, with key characteristics highlighted 
in Table 2.  Its physical dimensions can be compared to the existing patrol aircraft, the P-
3C Orion in Figure 2.  The aircraft sensors are based upon the proven and upgraded 
maritime patrol sensors and systems utilized in the P-3 Modified Upgrade Program with a 
host of other systems upgrades and additions (Tuemler et al., 2009).  The P-8A is 
currently in Milestone C of the acquisition cycle.  By 2012, the P-8A training squadron is 
scheduled to have 12 aircraft in its inventory, and the first operational squadron is 
scheduled to have its primary assigned aircraft allowance of seven by 2018 (WBB 
Consulting, 2007, Appendix-A-1). The Navy will transition to the new MPRF platform 
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one base and one squadron at a time beginning with the Fleet Readiness Squadron (FRS) 
and VP squadrons and NAS Jacksonville, FL, followed by the VP squadrons in MCBH 
Kaneohe Bay, HI, and NAS Whidbey Island, WA, respectively.  
 
Figure 2.   Size Comparison, P-3 and 737-800 
(From NAVAIR MER Facilities Document, 2009, p. 6) 
 
The P-8A is powered by two CFM International CFM56-7B27A turbofan engines 
and is equipped with in a universal aerial refueling receptacle that will provide In-Flight 
Refueling (IFR) capability.  This new in-flight refueling capability for the Navy Patrol 
community provides increased the operational flexibility and reach of the P-8A by 
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extending its time on station, and enabling persistence and continuity of operations 
during ASW, ISR and ASUW missions (DON, 2007). 
Table 2.   P-8A Physical Dimensions 
(From NAVAIR MER 2009, p. 2) 
ITEM DIMENSION 
Wing Span 124 feet, 6 inches 
Horizontal Tail 47 feet, 1 inch 
Internal Cabin Width 11 feet, 7 inches 
Height 16 feet, 0 inches 
Height at Tail 42 feet, 2 inches 
Length 129 feet, 6 inches 
Fuel Capacity 75,169 pounds 
Weight (Empty) 141,800 pounds 
Weight (Max Takeoff) 187,700 pounds 
 
C. POSEIDON DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT 
Currently, P-3s operate from three Main Operating Bases (MOB) where patrol 
squadrons (VP) are permanently assigned.  These MOBs are located at NAS Whidbey 
Island, WA, NAS Jacksonville, FL, and MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI.  From these MOBs, a 
squadron deploys in rotation to a designated Primary Deployment Site (PDS) located in 
the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleet Areas of Operation (AOR).   These PDSs are the centers of 
operations for each deployed MPRF squadron and are capable of sustained operations 
and performance of all major aircraft maintenance.  From the PDSs, squadrons deploy 
aircraft detachments to various Forward Operating Locations (FOL) that have known and 
established support capabilities.  Squadrons are capable of sending out multiple 
detachments at one time.  Although detachments are not sent to the same FOL during 
every deployment, there are, however, known and fixed P-3 detachment sites with an 
infrastructure already established to service and support P-3 aircraft and aircrew, and 
with the capability of facilitating limited aircraft maintenance should it be required. 
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The basing and deployment concept of the P-8A Poseidon shares many 
similarities to that of the P-3; however, the P-8A deployment concept aims to eliminate 
the reliance on fixed deployment locations, rigid support systems and with a smaller fleet 
of aircraft.  The P-8A is designed to deploy with the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
(BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), the Navy’s version of the Air Force’s 
Global Hawk, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).  It is also designed to provide long-
range, persistent maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions 
to complement MPRF operations (WBB Consulting, 2007, Appendix-A-2).   
The current concept of operations (CONOPS) calls for the P-8As to operate from 
6 locations in one AOR for more than 30 days.  Unlike the P-3’s deployment concept of 
fixed, robust, established sites, the deployment concept that the new P-8As will adopt is 
more flexible and eliminates the dependence on fixed deployment locations (p. 2). 
Instead, it deploys to a specified FOL, with maintenance support airlifted to that location 
(based on the mission and length of deployment and Category (Cat) of that airfield) 
(WBB Consulting, 2007).  This method of deployment allows for a more flexible and 
agile force to deal with future threats throughout the world but also mandates a greater 
degree of sophisticated planning, and introduces several significant risks due to the 
necessity of a highly robust supply chain. 
D. P-8A POSEIDON SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 
Because of the new deployment strategy that the MPRF will undertake with the 
deployment of the P-8A, new support requirements will need to be considered in order to 
support the P-8A at the FOLs.  The transition to this new expeditionary concept of 
deployment involves moving an entire support detachment to include personnel, ground 
support equipment, tools, spare parts, habitability items, maintenance and operations and 
berthing structures, weapons and weapons storage, fuel, and fuel storage to the forward 
location to support maritime and littoral ASW, ASUW, and/or ISR missions.1  
Additionally, provisions will have to be made to resupply those items necessary to 
conduct ongoing missions.  This transition to a more flexible, scalable, and responsive 
                                                 
1 The Appendix lists all required support assets that must be transported to the FOL according to airfield 
category. 
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expeditionary deployment concept significantly increases the MPRF transportation 
requirements.  Table 3 highlights transportation requirements and the various 
combinations of transportation options modeled in Figure 3, associated with the transition 
to the P-8’s deployment concept.  Coordination of these requirements must take into 
consideration a number of factors, specifically: 
1) the type of mission and MPRF tasking 
2) the category of airfield from which to redeploy or operate   
3) the means of transportation to consider to deliver aircraft and mission 
support assets, and  
4) the type of support package required to sustain the aircraft, the mission, 
and its personnel during a specified timeframe. 
Table 3.   Logistics and Maintenance Systems to Support P-8A Expeditionary  
Support Requirements 






Proposition Stock Military Sealift 
ASW / ISR 1 Full PUK Military Airlift 
ISR 2 GSE Commercial Airlift 
HA / DR  Weapons Commercial Sealift 
  Stores Intra-Theater Lift 
  Combination Organic Assets 
   Combination 
 
E. JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM 
(JOPES) 
To move personnel and equipment downrange to the FOL, transportation must be 
coordinated well in advance of the actual deployment.  Planning and coordination of 
personnel and equipment moves to FOLs is accomplished through the Joint Operational 
Planning and Execution Systems (JOPES), an electronic information system that is used 
to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, and sustainment activities 
associated with joint operations, and overseen by the U.S. Joint Forces Command 
(USJFC) and the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)  (Bates 2004).  Force 
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movement information fed up-line in JOPES is used by operators and planners to 
maintain and manage the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) database 
used to plan and execute the strategic movement of forces from one geographic region to 
another. (Bates, 2004). 
Because neither MPRF nor CPRG own dedicated airlift assets solely assigned to 
support deploying VP squadrons (such as Navy Reserve C-130s), deploying squadrons 
must rely on JOPES to coordinate and schedule transportation from the MOB to their 
PDS and FOLs.  This involves communicating requirements to TRANSCOM via the 
MPRF JOPES single point of contact: how many seats to reserve for passengers, how 
much cargo must be transported, the destination of the passengers and cargo, and the date 
that the airlift must happen.  To qualify for a “dedicated” airlift to the PDS or FOL 
through JOPES, 100 people and at least 15 short tons (STONS), or 30,000 pounds of 
cargo, must be requested for airlift, and there may be no mixed-in cargo or passengers 
from outside entities, and no intermediate layovers for loading/unloading of separate 
passengers and cargo.  There is a minimum of 15 STONS of cargo (30,000 lbs), and if the 
JOPES request does not meet the minimum requirements, TRANSCOM aggregates the 
lift with additional cargo and/or passengers, which induces layovers and delays en route 
to the PDS or FOLs (Patrol Squadron TEN, n.d., p. 2).  Additionally, on the day of on-
load, the number of passengers boarding the aircraft should be within 5 percent of the 
initial JOPES request, as TRANSCOM tends to look unfavorably at the requesting 
organization should the passenger numbers conflict with the initial manifest.  (Patrol 
Squadron TEN, n.d., p. 2)  Once a JOPES request is approved, the request must be met 
within 72 hours.  
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V. SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS  
A. TRANSPORTATION CONCERNS OF PRESENT P-3C AND FUTURE  
P-8A DEPLOYMENTS 
Currently, the most austere FOL utilized by Navy P-3 squadrons is the U.S. Naval 
Expeditionary Base, Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, Africa.  Because there is preexisting 
infrastructure in Djibouti, very little equipment needs to be airlifted to this FOL to 
support the occupying VP squadrons.  However, the established infrastructure at Camp 
Lemonier presents three problems with respect to expediting mission, aircraft, and 
habitability equipment as well as a support detachment to the FOL.  Because of the light 
cargo load to Djibouti, the JOPES airlift request doesn’t meet the strategic minimum lift 
requirements for a dedicated lift.  Therefore, TRANSCOM must aggregate VP loads with 
additional cargo, resulting in the delay of support personnel and equipment reaching the 
FOL (Patrol Squadron TEN, n.d., p. 3). 
Secondly, in the event that a P-3 must be deployed to a strategic FOL with little to 
no available aircraft support, the community does not have standardized procedures to 
support heavy MPRF redeployment during a heavy ASW, ASUW, or ISR mission, 
including any combination of these missions.  This presents a potential problem in 
coordinating airlifts, in that cargo and passenger data needs to be fed up line through 
JOPES well in advance of the date of departure, and multiple revision to the cargo load 
and passenger count is highly discouraged by TRANSCOM (as this adversely affects the 
cargo requests of other requesting organizations).  (Patrol Squadron TEN, n.d., p. 1)  
Currently, ad hoc transportation of equipment that includes spare parts, test equipment, 
and weapons that need to be transported to the FOL uses spare cargo capacity on the P-3 
aircraft being used at the FOL. 
Finally, with the transition to the new P-8A Poseidon and the MPRF’s new 
concept of deployment, transportation of personnel and support packages based on 
airfield classification and mission type generates additional airlift requirements that grow 
significantly with deployments to lower category airfields, such as CAT-0 and CAT-1.  
The additional airlift requirements generated by the P-8s’ new CONOPS will require 
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advance planning in streamlining what are the “must-haves” downrange at the FOL and 
require building support and airlift packages, or PUKs, accordingly as well as increasing 
the number of dedicated lifts from TRANSCOM. 
B. NETWORK TRANSPORTATION MODEL FOR THE P-8A 
There is risk associated with any support infrastructure that includes 
transportation of sustainment items OCONUS.  Military transportation networks can 
often be very complex; they are frequently subject to delays, customs, and cargo 
restrictions that prevent the end-user from receiving required items at the right time.  To 
illustrate the possible future complexity of the P-8A support infrastructure, Figure 3 
shows how complicated the sustainment and transportation network will be for MPRF, no 
matter how small the detachment footprint.  Future support staff must able to recognize, 
anticipate, and maneuver the much larger sustainment structure of the P-8A through the 
transportation network as well as retrograde all material.  Figure 3 makes the assumption 
of two typical mission sets are being executed, each possibly requiring a full set of 
sustainment and support packages, and possible combinations of transportation modes.  A 
prepositioned system will support the mission packages with items collocated at the hubs 
and will accompany any PUK parts along with required GSE, weapons, and other gear.  
These missions support items can be task organized to better allow for greater flexibility 
and responsiveness for the MPRF.  The multiple transportation modes in Figure 3 are all 
possible routes and transportation modes to move MPRF equipment to an austere FOL.  
The complexity of redeployment and sustainment using the network flow model in Figure 














Figure 3.   Network Flow Model of Transportation and Sustainment of P-8A 
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Identifying the necessary and critical items needed to support the new P-8A for 
various mission types, deployment lengths, and airfield categories requires extensive 
planning and coordination, and presents a challenge to the MPRF as it transitions away 
from its “fixed” FOLs.  Currently, the weight and cube requirements for the additional 
equipment required to support the P-8 and its expeditionary concept of operations is 
unknown.  However, it is known how many additional line-items are required, and we 
can use what little information is available to provide some estimate of the additional 
sustainment requirement for the P-8 (versus the P-3). Figure 4 identifies the differences in 
current support requirements between the P-3C and the P-8A based on: 
 ASW missions 
 P-8A FOL requirements based on deployment to austere CAT-0 airfields 
 P-3 FOL requirements based on Djibouti, Africa current infrastructure 
setup 
 Deployment length of less than 90 days 
 Support requirements for 1-4 aircraft requiring major sustainment 
 Airlift support provided by Air Force C-17 aircraft 
 No differentiation in tonnage regarding general support equipment 
between P-3 and P-8 (WBB Consulting, 2007, Appendix-C-22) 
Note:  Current MPRF requirements using the fixed-basing structure utilized by 
the P-3 are highlighted in gray.  As the MPRF transitions to the P-8A, additional support 
requirements are highlighted in black. 
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Figure 4.   Difference in Support Requirements in Transitioning to the P-8A 
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C. P-3 VERSUS P-8 FOL REQUIREMENTS 
A notable difference in the comparison between the P-3 and P-8 in Figures 3 and 
4 is the increase in support requirements needed to deploy and sustain the P-8 at a CAT-0 
airfield.  As mentioned earlier, this increase in requirements for the P-8 is due to the fact 
that P-3s currently operate from FOLs that already have an established support 
infrastructure—in which P-3 squadrons/detachments simply rotate in and out, and turn 
over custody of PUKs, aircraft support items, and weapons to the incoming P-3 units 
(Evangelista, 2008, p. 4).  The MPRF’s P-8 deployment concept, however, is moving 
toward a flexible, scalable, and responsive force that will react to global contingencies, 
allowing its aircraft to redeploy from its Hub or PDS, to potentially austere FOLs that 
have little to no aircraft and/or mission support capabilities available (WBB Consulting, 
2007, p. 14).  Therefore, to support a detachment of P-8 aircraft at a CAT-0 or CAT-1 
airfield, the footprint for aircraft and mission requirements is considerably larger than 
that of the P-3’s traditional concept of deployment—as a mission support package must 
be transported downrange to the austere FOL to allow the aircraft and personnel to 
properly conduct and sustain the MPRF mission in that specific AOR.  
These comparisons highlights the differences in requirements between the current 
P-3 deployment concept and what would be required for the P-8 Poseidon aircraft to 
redeploy to an austere FOL— moving the aircraft and mission support package closer to 
the AOR of interest.  Additionally, what should be noted is that the transportation 
requirements highlighted in Figure 4 for the P-8 are designed for contingency operations 
and MPRF’s response to real-world threats.  Under peacetime operations, the P-8’s 
support footprint should decrease significantly (to reflect a footprint similar in size to that 
to support current P-3 FOL requirements), with notable exception to additional GSE and 
other P-8/Boeing 737-peculiar mission-required support items.  
1. Packup Kits (PUK)/Modified PUK for Austere FOL Redeployment 
Standard Navy aviation PUKs contain the necessary spares to support deployed 
aircraft, such as critical or high-failure/high-usage aircraft parts, components, and high-
value/high-usage consumables.  Current P-3 detachments operate from FOLs with a PUK 
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already forward positioned, in which inventory of the PUK is continuously turned over 
from the outgoing detachment to the incoming one (Evangelista 2008, p. 4). 
Conversely, for P-8s to redeploy to an austere airfield, arrangements must be 
made to transport a PUK downrange to the FOL that contains the items necessary to 
sustain the aircraft for that specific type mission.  The P-8A PUK requirements 
highlighted in Figure 4 indicate a Modified PUK, as the items in this PUK will need to 
include 737-common, mission-specific, and Navy-common repair parts.  PUKs may 
differ for each type of mission and may be tailored to minimize transportation efforts and 
footprint in that AOR.  Many of the P-8’s 737-common aircraft components are shared 
commercially with civilian airliners that use the Boeing 737 and may be used to augment 
the PUKs.  This will be an area of high risk because of commercial regulations, and it 
requires more test cases CONUS before integrating with deployed VP units and the 
supporting PUKs. 
2. Cargo Lift for Redeployment and Sustainment 
As represented in Figure 4, there is a significant difference in the number of 
airlifts required to support the P-8 versus the P-3, again due to the existing support 
infrastructure that exists at all P-3 FOLs.  To redeploy a P-8 to a CAT-0 FOL requires the 
transportation of personnel, equipment, tools, habitability and operations items, GSE, 
weapons, sonobuoys, PUK, test equipment, vehicles, MTOC, fuel, etc.—requiring 
significant airlift support (WBB Consulting, 2007).  GSE assets alone required to support 
one to four aircraft during major sustainment up to four C-17 aircraft (WBB Consulting, 
2007, pp. C-21–C-22). An additional airlift would be required to transport diesel fuel to 
the FOL to support the operations of GSE, should the availability of local diesel fuel 
suppliers not be available.  (WBB Consulting 2007, p. 23, 25).  One last airlift would be 
required to transport personnel, along with their habitability, mission equipment, tools, 
etc to the FOL (Patrol Squadron TEN n.d., 2–3).  
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3. Aviation Fuel 
P-3s operating at current FOLs rely on contracted support for refueling aircraft.  
At an austere FOL, contracted supported aviation refueling may not be available.  For 
contingency planning, should contracted aviation full support not be available, the MPRF 
requires the resupply of aviation fuel, transported by means of surface vessel (WBB 
Consulting, 2007, p. 25).   
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Coordination of logistics support for expeditionary naval assets OCONUS is very 
challenging, even for experienced logisticians.  Both inter- and intra-theater sustainment 
is even more complex and demanding, requiring more logistics planning and proper 
organizational structure.   The OCONUS MPRF model requires operations on short 
notice with task-organized forces using a hub-and-spoke operational concept to employ 
the full spectrum of MPRF capabilities.  Naval logistics personnel are faced with 
supporting a new naval aviation airframe that:  
1) has an entirely new configuration based upon a commercial aircraft  
2) has a high degree of uncertainty in the demand for spares and lead times 
for replenishment 
3) must operate with a reduced footprint and 
4) must operate in an austere environment without established infrastructure 
overseas. 
Combatant Commanders plan and develop the theater logistics systems, however 
service component commanders and numbered fleet commanders have operational 
logistics responsibilities within the geographical boundaries to provide services and 
execute the system.   The logistics task force commander normally exercises operational 
control (OPCON) of assigned combat logistics forces and is responsible for coordinating 
the replenishment of forces at sea.  However, the MPRF and other Naval Expeditionary 
Forces are focused on supporting the naval forces on the ground and requires different 
sustainment when supporting and moving naval forces into theater (Joint Pub 4-0, 2008).      
A. ESTABLISH PARTNERSHIPS AND SIGN MEMORANDUMS OF 
AGREEMENT 
The MPRF and CPRF must inquire about potential partners within naval 
expeditionary or defense logistics systems to create partnerships to better support the 
expeditionary environment in which the P-8A is expected to operate (Nilsen, Tessier, 
Lugo & Perez, 2004).   Working with USTRANSCOM for dedicated airlift priority for 
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redeployment of ASW and ISR missions, as well as supporting austere spoke locations 
where cargo lift assets do not normally fly, will be essential to maintaining operational 
readiness under the new CONOPs. Within the OCONUS operational logistics 
infrastructure already in place to support the Fleet Commander, we recommend that a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) be signed with Naval Logistics Forces under the 
fleet commanders (i.e., CTF-53/73/63) for dedicated intra-theater cargo lift and other 
logistics services to support MPRF sustainment and critical movement of Boeing 
DUPMP concept downrange at potential FOBs.   
B. CREATE A POSIEDON EXPEDITIONARY MAINTENANCE AND 
LOGISTICS CELL  
In addition to ensuring external logistics support, it is recommended that the 
CPRF create an Expeditionary Maintenance and Logistics Cell (EMLC) initially focused 
on Poseidon support and later the full Family of Systems (FOS).  The EMLC will be a 
fundamental shift for MPRF units and elements to better support expeditionary 
operations beyond PDSs.  Supporting the MPRF’s Expeditionary mission of enabling the 
MPRF to be flexible, scalable, responsive and expeditionary, the EMLC will be critical to 
OCONUS logistical and maintenance support, continuity of operations, and sustainment 
of support knowledge in theater.  Poseidon operations will require a more robust support 
footprint than P-3 Orion operations would need in austere environments, see Figure 4.  In 
addition to normal peacetime hub-and-spoke locations, the EMLC will be essential for 
pushing spokes downrange into operating locations where airfields within category 0, 1, 
or 2 are utilized. 
C. ESTABLISH SUPPORT BILLETS 
There are several options to develop and employ the EMLC with the current 
Command Structure under COMPATRECONFOR: (1) An expansion of the CTF staff, 
creation of additional billets co-located with CTF 57 and CTF 72 in Bahrain and Japan, 
or anywhere hub support structure may be located, and (2) The establishment of a 
separate command under CPRF and OPCON to the CTF commander.  The focus of the 
billets will be in expanding any current support personnel with several layers of expertise 
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that will include qualified petty officers, chief petty officers and officers.  The focus of 
the personnel filling these billets will primarily be logisticians, maintainers, and 
embarkation specialists.  Many of the requirements needed of the EMLC personnel can 
be aligned with local existing infrastructure to better suit the CTF commander’s needs.  
For example, certain elements will need to interface on a daily basis with the AIMD at 
hub locations and may be required to serve as EMLC detachments at AIMD 
Sigonella/Bahrain/ Kadena.  Several critical skill sets that are not maintained within 
organic VP organizations include:  
1) Embarkation–Providing permanent JOPES expertise for embarkation and 
deployment of VP squadrons, as well as experience in sealift and airlift in 
theater.  This embarkation staff will conduct flight planning, palletization, 
and interaction with USAF and USN cargo load masters.  2)  MTOC 
support – All items in addition to current MPRF that will support MTOC 
operations, movement, and security associated with those missions.    
2) Logistics / Expeditor–A dedicated supply cell that manages and tracks all 
required items, interacting with the Boeing support team for DUPMP 
commercial support.  Logistics services will also include HAZMAT, small 
purchasing, and contracts support.    
3) PUK and IMRL–The EMLC will take responsibility for PUKs at Hub 
locations.   
4) AIMD GSE Liaison–Coordinate the transportation and oversee the 
movement of required GSE to the FOLs, and communicates GSE shipping 
requirements to AIMD in preparation for airlifts. 
The EMLC team should take the majority of the external supply burden off of VP 
squadron LSs, which are required to be located at all spokes as well as one LS as CNAF 
expeditor TAD in Norfolk throughout deployment and 2 LSs to be required at ASD 
Bahrain (Evangelista, 2008).  As MPRF transitions to the FOS, VP squadrons supply 
personnel will struggle to sustain MPRF assets and maintain hub operations, while 
multiple logistics specialists are not at the hub.  Naval Aviation assets at the squadron-
level organization only maintain a minimal of enlisted supply personnel and normally no 
 34
Supply Corps officers at either the squadron or the wing level.  The navy enlisted rating 
(LS) Logistics Specialists are a recent reclassification of the Storekeeper (SK) rating, 
after being combined with the (AK) Aviation Storekeeper rating. Prepositioning 
equipment and PUKs in custody of the EMLC will be a cultural shift away from VP 
squadrons as temporary custodians every 6 months, to a full-time dedicated custodian 
who is directly responsible to the CTF commander for maintaining the readiness of the 
PUK and GSE.  
D. DEVELOP AND INVEST IN PREPOSITIONED FLY-AWAY-KIT   
We also recommend the creation of additional stock of pre-established kits 
collocated at the PDS locations.  These items are historically difficult to transport through 
either commercial or military transportation networks, long lead items, and items that the 
MPRF never wants to run out of.  These kited items can be maintained by a third party 
support organization such as Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), DLA or a 
commercial warehousing company such as used in Bahrain. The Bahrain and New 
Zealand (BANZ) warehouse and freight terminal in Bahrain is collocated at Naval 
Support Activity Bahrain, utilized by various CTFs and TYCOMS as temporary storage 
of non-classified material for further transfer to naval deployed assets within the 5th Fleet 
AOR.  Recommended items based on historical “Head-Hurters” and post deployment 
reports include: 
 Bottled Gases  
 HAZMAT 
 Weapons including sonobuoys  
 Heavy and oversized SE and GSE 
 Forklifts (20K Hyster) if needed for P-8 maintenance and cargo loading 
 Consumables / office supplies / small purchases  




Table 4.   Infrastructure Requirements for Expeditionary Operations  
(From WBB Consulting, 2007, p. 16)   
 
 
Table 5.   Facility Requirements for Expeditionary Operations  
(FromWBB Consulting 2007, p. 17) 
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Table 6.   Operating Factors for Establishing an Expeditionary Aircraft Hangar  
(From WBB Consulting, 2007, p. 18) 
 
 
Table 7.   Equipment Requirements for Expeditionary Operations 




Table 8.   Consumable Requirements for Expeditionary Operations 
 (From WBB Consulting, 2007, p. 22) 
 
 
Table 9.   Expendable Requirements for Expeditionary Operations  
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